WorldbyFlow•Structured Information
Generated July 12, 2026· defense· 32 sources

Ukraine's Deep-Strike Campaign: Strategic Coercion or Absorbable Attrition

The Arguments
The Proposition
Ukraine's deep-strike campaign constitutes strategically decisive coercion against Russia rather than damage Russia can absorb without altering its war-termination calculus.

Overview

Ukraine has mounted a sustained and expanding campaign of drone and missile strikes against Russian energy infrastructure, military aviation, and logistics deep inside Russian territory. The central dispute is whether this campaign is generating coercive leverage sufficient to alter Moscow's war-termination calculus, or whether Russia possesses enough redundancy, adaptation capacity, and fiscal substitution to absorb the damage without strategic consequence.

Brief

Ukraine's capacity to strike deep into Russian territory has grown dramatically since 2024, driven by indigenous drone and missile production. By March 2026, Ukraine launched approximately 7,000 long-range drones in a single month — for the first time exceeding Russia's own strike volume — reaching targets over 1,500 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory. The campaign has concentrated on oil refining infrastructure, military aviation, and increasingly on export nodes including ports and shadow-fleet tankers. As of mid-2026, Russian fuel rationing has appeared in multiple regions, crude oil processed into domestic products has fallen sharply, and at least one major Moscow refinery is not expected to resume production until 2027.
The energy-strike campaign sits atop a deteriorating Russian fiscal picture. Russia's oil and gas revenues fell to a five-year low in 2025, collecting approximately 8.48–8.7 trillion rubles in hydrocarbon taxes — roughly 24 percent below 2024 — while the country's GDP growth slowed from the 4–5 percent wartime surge of 2023–2024 to an estimated 0.6–1 percent in 2025. The 2026 defense budget was set at approximately $183 billion (nearly 40 percent of federal expenditure), placing acute pressure on non-military spending at the very moment energy revenues are contracting. These structural stresses do not yet constitute collapse, but they compound each other in ways that are beginning to constrain Moscow's fiscal headroom.
The strike campaign is not limited to energy. Operation Spiderweb (June 1, 2025) demonstrated that Ukraine's Security Service could infiltrate FPV drones into Russia aboard commercial trucks and strike five strategic airbases simultaneously — destroying or damaging a confirmed minimum of approximately 10 Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 strategic bombers at Olenya, Belaya, and other bases, aircraft that cannot be replaced given Soviet-era production lines. The surviving bomber fleet has been relocated to the Far East, adding roughly 23 hours of additional flight time per mission against Ukraine and accelerating airframe wear on aging platforms.
The skeptic case rests on several durable observations. Russia possesses Soviet-era refinery overcapacity well above current throughput needs, enabling partial operations at struck facilities even while repairs proceed. Carnegie Endowment analysis found that during the 2024 campaign, most refineries restored full output within weeks of individual attacks. Russian crude oil export volumes remained at a wartime high of approximately 3.46 million barrels per day as recently as early 2026 — rising even as product exports fell — because Moscow redirected unrefined crude to export markets, maintaining revenue continuity. And critically, Russian economic pain has not translated into any observable change in Moscow's negotiating position: as of late June 2026, the Kremlin was publicly conditioning any talks on Ukraine ceding the Donbas, with no sign that infrastructure pressure has softened those terms.

The Arguments

The Case For(6)
Cumulative refinery damage is now outpacing Russia's repair and reconstitution capacity.
Reasoning: Early strikes in 2024 could be repaired within weeks; the 2025–2026 intensification — over 140 strikes on oil infrastructure in 2025 alone, with heavier munitions hitting refinery structures rather than storage tanks — is generating damage faster than Russian industrial repair capacity can absorb it. By mid-2026, Moscow's largest refinery was not expected to resume production until 2027, indicating the attrition curve has bent.
Evidence: Reuters estimated a roughly 17 percent reduction in Russian refining capacity (approximately 1.1 million barrels per day). One analyst cited by AP found that crude oil processed into domestic fuel in June 2026 was down 25 percent year-on-year, the lowest level in over two decades. Fuel rationing emerged in multiple regions including Crimea.
Moderate strength
Operation Spiderweb demonstrated that no Russian military asset, anywhere in Russian territory, is beyond reach — collapsing a foundational assumption of Russian strategic depth.
Reasoning: Airbases in Murmansk and Siberia, previously considered inviolable, were struck simultaneously using commercially transported FPV drones. The operational concept — patient infiltration, synchronized multi-base attack, irreplaceable platform destruction — is repeatable and scalable. Surviving bomber fleets relocated to the Far East now require approximately 23 additional hours of flight time per mission, accelerating wear on aging, irreplaceable airframes.
Evidence: The Financial Times assessed Operation Spiderweb damaged and destroyed aircraft constituting approximately 20 percent of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet. Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 production lines closed with the Soviet Union and cannot be restarted. Russia subsequently shifted remaining strategic bombers to Far Eastern bases to reduce vulnerability.
Strong strength
Ukraine's indigenous deep-strike industrial base has achieved scale that removes Western political constraints as a binding limit on the campaign.
Reasoning: Prior to 2024, Ukraine's deep-strike capability was constrained by Western weapons restrictions tied to escalation concerns. The emergence of indigenous systems — including the Flamingo cruise missile with a reported 3,000-kilometer range and the Peklo missile drone — means Ukraine can now sustain the campaign regardless of allied authorization decisions. The crossing of the monthly strike volume threshold in March 2026 (more drones launched than Russia) reflects real industrial capacity, not a one-off surge.
Evidence: Ukraine launched approximately 1,000 drones against Russia in August 2024, 3,000 in July 2025, and approximately 7,000 in March 2026 — the first month in which Ukraine exceeded Russia's own launch volume. The Flamingo cruise missile was unveiled in August 2025. Ukraine is no longer reliant on partner permissions to strike deep inside Russia.
Strong strength
Energy revenue compression, compounded across oil prices, sanctions, and strikes, is degrading the fiscal foundation of Russia's war economy at a moment when defense spending is consuming nearly 40 percent of the federal budget.
Reasoning: No single cause explains Russia's hydrocarbon revenue collapse of approximately 24 percent year-on-year in 2025; strikes are one compounding factor among several. But the convergence matters strategically: when oil prices are low, sanctions bite harder, and strikes degrade refinery throughput simultaneously, the fiscal buffers Moscow relied on in 2022–2024 compress in ways the Kremlin cannot fully offset through tax hikes alone.
Evidence: Russia's oil and gas revenues fell to approximately 8.48–8.7 trillion rubles in 2025 — a five-year low. The 2026 defense budget was set at approximately $183 billion, nearly 40 percent of federal expenditure. Moscow raised VAT from 20 to 22 percent from January 2026 to offset the shortfall, a measure explicitly linked by officials to defense funding needs.
Moderate strength
Fuel rationing inside Russia and supply disruptions reaching ordinary citizens create domestic political pressure that autocratic war economies cannot indefinitely insulate from.
Reasoning: Russia's wartime political model has depended on insulating the consumer population from war costs. Fuel queues in multiple regions, gas station rationing in Crimea, the mayor of Irkutsk ordering portable toilets for motorists in line, and black smoke over Moscow captured on social media are precisely the domestic visibility events that erode the political insulation Moscow needs. Coercion does not require collapse; it requires accumulating costs that alter cost-benefit calculations at the top.
Evidence: AP reporting from late June 2026 documented hourslong fuel queues across Russian regions, rationing in Crimea including a halt to civilian sales, and explicit public acknowledgment of 'problems' by the Russian president — a rare public admission. A June 2026 CNN count found Ukraine had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times since February 2022.
Moderate strength
Systematic degradation of Russia's integrated air defense network is creating cascading vulnerability across all strike domains.
Reasoning: Between June 2025 and March 2026, Ukraine conducted confirmed engagements against 237 air defense-related targets including launcher units and radars, and 196 radar and electronic warfare systems. A suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses (SEAD) campaign that degrades the interceptor inventory simultaneously increases the penetration probability for subsequent energy and military strikes, creating a compounding dynamic where each successful strike makes the next one easier.
Evidence: Tochnyi analysis cited engagements against 237 air defense-related targets between June 2025 and March 2026. Ukrainian officials assessed Moscow was running low on key S-300 interceptors. Russian air defense relocations to protect Moscow created coverage gaps in other regions.
Moderate strength
The Case Against(6)
Russia has demonstrated a persistent adaptation — redirecting unrefined crude to export markets — that sustains revenue continuity even while domestic refining capacity contracts.
Reasoning: The most important adaptation is not repair speed at individual facilities but the strategic pivot from refined products to crude exports. Russian crude export volumes reached a wartime high of approximately 3.46 million bpd in early 2026 even as product exports fell. This workaround severs the link between refinery damage and revenue impact, which is the central mechanism the coercion case requires.
Evidence: Baker Institute analysis confirmed Russian crude exports were steady or rising while refined product exports fell, attributing the divergence to strike-induced refinery damage that shifted crude from domestic processing to direct export. Raw crude export volumes in early 2026 exceeded the previous wartime high set in 2023.
Strong strength
Ukraine's revenue-compression impact is inseparable from global oil price declines and sanctions — strikes alone are insufficient to attribute the fiscal damage to coercive effect.
Reasoning: Russia's 35 percent year-on-year decline in oil-related budget revenues between May and December 2025 was broadly in line with a 32 percent decline in the ruble price of exported oil — driven primarily by global price movements and ruble appreciation, not by strike-induced volume reductions. Attribution matters: if oil prices recover or the ruble weakens, Moscow's fiscal position can improve substantially without any change in Ukraine's strike campaign.
Evidence: New Eurasian Strategies Centre analysis found that Russian oil output in 2025 was only 2.5 percent below 2021 levels — roughly in line with OPEC+ quotas — and that sanctions had reshaped logistics but had not substantially reduced export volumes. Global price declines and ruble appreciation were identified as the primary drivers of lower fiscal revenues.
Strong strength
Russia's repair speed at individual facilities has consistently surprised analysts, and the Soviet-era overcapacity inheritance provides structural buffer against any single strike sequence.
Reasoning: Russia's refining infrastructure was built for Soviet-era demand levels substantially higher than current throughput, meaning meaningful excess capacity exists even before wartime repair activity. Carnegie Endowment analysis found that during the 2024 campaign, struck refineries typically restored full output within weeks. The 38 percent capacity figure widely cited in 2025 represented the upper bound of potential damage — the actual reduction in throughput was materially lower.
Evidence: Carnegie Endowment (October 2025) found that most refineries struck in 2024 kept operating at least partially and restored full output within weeks. Russia's design refining capacity on paper is approximately 327 million tons per year (6.5 million barrels per day) — well above actual throughput requirements, providing structural cushion.
Strong strength
Economic pain has produced no observable change in Moscow's war-termination position — the coercion mechanism has not translated into political effect.
Reasoning: Compellence requires the adversary to actively change behavior — not merely to absorb costs. As of late June 2026, Moscow was publicly conditioning any negotiations on Ukraine ceding the Donbas, terms identical to Russia's maximal 2022 position. Domestic political structures in Russia suppress the transmission mechanism between economic pain and leadership behavior change, meaning the coercion theory requires an implicit assumption about elite pressure that available evidence does not support.
Evidence: Al Jazeera reporting from late June 2026 noted the Russian president publicly stated readiness for talks only 'on the basis of' the 2022 Istanbul framework — which included demands for Ukraine to surrender the Donbas. The same reporting confirmed Russian ground advances continued west of Lyman concurrently with the peak domestic fuel crisis.
Strong strength
Moscow has demonstrated fiscal substitution capacity — VAT increases, tax hikes, spending compression — that can partially offset energy revenue shortfalls without conceding strategic objectives.
Reasoning: A government facing revenue compression that can raise domestic taxes, compress civilian expenditure, and draw on sovereign wealth funds is not necessarily approaching a coercive threshold. Russia raised VAT from 20 to 22 percent from January 2026, explicitly to fund defense spending. The Bruegel Institute found that Russia retains additional fiscal adjustment levers — further tax rate increases, elimination of exemptions, domestic borrowing — that give Moscow runway beyond what current revenue figures suggest.
Evidence: Russia raised VAT from 20 to 22 percent from January 2026, explicitly linked by officials to defense funding needs. The Bruegel Institute (December 2025) assessed Russia could sustain its fiscal position at least through 2026 through further non-hydrocarbon revenue increases and expenditure compression.
Moderate strength
Nuclear signaling and escalation deterrence have functioned as a ceiling on Western support and continue to constrain the targeting depth and munition quality available to Ukraine.
Reasoning: Russia's nuclear signaling has been operationally effective at slowing the delivery of key weapons systems throughout the war. Even as Ukrainian indigenous capabilities have grown, the most capable munitions — heavier ballistic systems, precision stand-off weapons with large warheads — remain constrained or prioritized for immediate military targets rather than energy infrastructure. The escalation ceiling structurally limits how decisively the campaign can be intensified at the moment of maximum effect.
Evidence: West Point Modern War Institute analysis (April 2026) noted that by end of 2025, nuclear saber-rattling had 'effectively deterred Western support, at a minimum by slowing the delivery of key weapons over the course of the war's first few years.' Baker Institute analysis (March 2026) noted Ukraine's Flamingo missiles were being prioritized toward immediate military targets such as the Votkinsk Missile Plant rather than energy infrastructure.
Moderate strength

The Strongest Point on Each Side

Strongest For
Ukraine has destroyed or damaged approximately 20 percent of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet in a single operation using irreplaceable Cold War-era airframes, while simultaneously ramping drone strikes to a volume exceeding Russia's own — demonstrating that no Russian asset anywhere in its territory is safe, at a cost Ukraine can industrially sustain.
Strongest Against
Russia has adapted its energy economy by redirecting unrefined crude to export markets, sustaining wartime-high crude export volumes even as refinery capacity contracted, while maintaining its maximalist negotiating position unchanged through the peak of Ukraine's domestic fuel crisis — suggesting the coercive threshold has not been reached and the political transmission mechanism may not function under Moscow's governance model.

What It Turns On (4)

Has cumulative strike damage now crossed the threshold at which Russia's reconstitution rate is slower than Ukraine's damage rate — making the degradation compounding rather than recoverable?
The entire coercion case depends on whether 2025–2026 intensity has finally bent the attrition curve past the point where repair timelines exceed re-strike intervals. If the answer is yes, the damage becomes structurally irreversible; if no, Russia remains on a treadmill where it absorbs and repairs cyclically without strategic constraint. The Moscow refinery's expected 6-month+ outage is suggestive but not yet conclusive system-wide evidence.
Is the political transmission mechanism from economic pain to Moscow's war-termination calculus functional under Russia's current governance structure?
Coercive logic requires that accumulated costs eventually change adversary behavior. The skeptic case holds that Russia's political system suppresses the feedback loop between domestic economic pain and elite decision-making. Resolving this crux requires answering whether any level of economic damage — short of literal state collapse — can alter the Kremlin's strategic position, or whether the coercion theory is structurally inapplicable to this adversary.
How much of Russia's revenue compression is attributable specifically to Ukrainian strikes versus global oil price movements and sanctions — and is the strike-specific effect large enough to be strategically meaningful on its own?
If strikes account for only a small fraction of the revenue shortfall, and the remainder is driven by exogenous price movements, then a global oil price recovery would neutralize Ukraine's campaign gains without any Russian adaptation — making the coercion effect contingent on commodity markets rather than military action.
Does the crude-for-refined-products substitution strategy remain viable as Ukraine extends its campaign to export ports, shadow-fleet tankers, and pipeline pumping stations?
The adaptation that most undercuts the coercion case — selling raw crude to maintain revenue — depends on export logistics remaining intact. As Ukraine shifts targeting to Novorossiysk, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium terminal, and tanker interdiction, the viability of this workaround becomes the decisive variable. If export infrastructure becomes as vulnerable as refining infrastructure, the crude-diversion buffer disappears.

What Each Side Concedes

The coercion camp must concede that Russia's crude-diversion adaptation is real and has meaningfully blunted the revenue impact of refinery strikes, and that absent a mechanism for elite pressure to translate economic pain into policy change, the causal chain from damage to war termination remains undemonstrated. The skeptic camp must concede that the 2025–2026 intensification has moved qualitatively beyond the 2024 campaign — the Moscow refinery's 6-month outage, fuel rationing at the scale of the June 2026 crisis, and the irreplaceable bomber losses are not simply 'more of the same' and that cumulative effects of this kind have historically mattered on timelines measured in years, not months.

Where the Evidence Points

The weight of available evidence supports a middle position: Ukraine's campaign is generating real and compounding costs that are measurably degrading Russia's energy revenue base, strategic aviation, and domestic political insulation — but has not yet crossed the threshold at which those costs alter Moscow's war-termination calculus. The question is genuinely open, and the outcome is more likely to be determined by whether Ukraine can extend the campaign to export infrastructure and maintain strike tempo than by any single escalation event. The most honest verdict is that the campaign is strategically consequential but not yet strategically decisive, and whether it becomes decisive turns on crux three and four above — attribution and export-route vulnerability — both of which are empirically unresolved.

Common Ground

  • The deep-strike campaign has imposed real and measurable costs on Russia's energy sector and strategic aviation that are not trivially reversible.
  • The campaign's strategic weight depends on sustainability and intensification over time, not on any single strike event.
  • Ukraine's development of indigenous long-range strike capability has permanently altered the operational geography of the conflict regardless of coercive effect.

Open Questions

  • If Ukraine successfully interdicts Novorossiysk and other major crude export terminals at the same tempo it has applied to refineries, does Russia's crude-diversion buffer collapse — and on what timeline?
  • Is there an identifiable fiscal or economic threshold at which Moscow's internal elite dynamics change, or does the governance structure absorb any level of economic damage short of state collapse?
  • What share of Russia's 2025–2026 revenue decline is attributable specifically to strike-induced volume reductions versus global price movements — and can that be isolated with sufficient confidence to calibrate the campaign?

Background Brief

Source facts the analysis is grounded in. The → chips after each fact link to the items above that rely on it.
F1
Ukraine launched approximately 7,000 long-range drones into Russia in March 2026 — for the first time exceeding Russia's own monthly strike volume — with some reaching targets over 1,500 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.
↳ The crossing of the volumetric threshold — Ukraine out-striking Russia — signals that Ukraine has reached industrial-scale deep-strike capacity, which is the prerequisite for the cumulative attrition argument to be valid at all.
Verified→ Argument 3 · Argument 6 · Argument 6
F2
Operation Spiderweb (June 1, 2025) — 117 FPV drones smuggled into Russia aboard commercial trucks — struck five Russian strategic airbases simultaneously, destroying or damaging an independently assessed minimum of approximately 10 Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers; the Financial Times assessed the damaged and destroyed aircraft made up around 20 percent of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet. The Tu-95 is no longer in production.
↳ Irreplaceable platform losses force Moscow to disperse remaining bombers to the Far East, adding approximately 23 hours of flight time per mission and accelerating airframe wear — a compounding operational cost, not a one-time attrition event.
Verified→ Argument 2 · Argument 3 · Argument 6
F3
Ukraine struck Russian oil infrastructure more than 140 times in 2025 — an increase of over 50 percent from 2024 — and had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times cumulatively since February 2022 by late June 2026. Reuters estimated strikes reduced Russian refining capacity by approximately 17 percent, or 1.1 million barrels per day.
↳ The scale and acceleration of strikes is the load-bearing fact for the coercion case: whether cumulative damage is outpacing Russia's repair capacity is the central empirical question the analysis turns on.
Verified→ Argument 1 · Argument 5 · Argument 3 · Argument 4
F4
Russia's oil and gas revenues fell to a five-year low in 2025 at approximately 8.48–8.7 trillion rubles (roughly $108–110 billion) — approximately 24 percent below 2024 and well below the originally budgeted 10.9 trillion rubles — while GDP growth slowed to an estimated 0.6–1 percent.
↳ Revenue decline at this scale, compounding a defense budget absorbing nearly 40 percent of federal expenditure, creates genuine fiscal compression — but it must be attributed to multiple causes (global oil prices, sanctions, ruble appreciation, strikes), not strikes alone.
Verified→ Argument 4 · Argument 5 · Argument 2 · Argument 4 · Argument 5
F5
Russian crude oil export volumes rose to a wartime high of approximately 3.46 million barrels per day in early 2026 — above the previous wartime high of 3.36 million bpd in 2023 — even as refined product exports fell, because Moscow redirected unrefined crude to export markets.
↳ This adaptation — selling crude instead of products — is the strongest single datum for the skeptic case: Moscow has a visible workaround that sustains export revenue continuity even while refining capacity contracts.
Verified→ Argument 1 · Argument 2 · Argument 6
F6
Carnegie Endowment analysis found that during the 2024 strike campaign, most struck Russian refineries kept operating at least in part and restored full output within weeks; Russia's 2026 budget was built on an oil export price assumption of approximately $59 per barrel, and Moscow raised VAT from 20 to 22 percent from January 2026 to offset declining hydrocarbon revenues.
↳ Russia's demonstrated repair speed and fiscal substitution capacity (tax hikes, spending reallocation) are the structural ceiling on how quickly strikes can generate irreversible damage — and set the empirical test for whether the 2025–2026 intensification has finally exceeded that ceiling.
Verified→ Argument 1 · Argument 4 · Argument 3 · Argument 5
high uncertainty· model's epistemic confidence in this analysis

Facts & Figures (6)

The claims behind this analysis, each with its verification status — including what is contested, unverified, or could not be established.
Ukraine launched approximately 7,000 long-range drones into Russia in March 2026 — for the first time exceeding Russia's own monthly strike volume — with some reaching targets over 1,500 kilometers from Ukrainian-controlled territory.
The crossing of the volumetric threshold — Ukraine out-striking Russia — signals that Ukraine has reached industrial-scale deep-strike capacity, which is the prerequisite for the cumulative attrition argument to be valid at all.
✓ GROUNDED
Operation Spiderweb (June 1, 2025) — 117 FPV drones smuggled into Russia aboard commercial trucks — struck five Russian strategic airbases simultaneously, destroying or damaging an independently assessed minimum of approximately 10 Tu-95 and Tu-22M3 bombers; the Financial Times assessed the damaged and destroyed aircraft made up around 20 percent of Russia's operational long-range aviation fleet. The Tu-95 is no longer in production.
Irreplaceable platform losses force Moscow to disperse remaining bombers to the Far East, adding approximately 23 hours of flight time per mission and accelerating airframe wear — a compounding operational cost, not a one-time attrition event.
✓ GROUNDED
Ukraine struck Russian oil infrastructure more than 140 times in 2025 — an increase of over 50 percent from 2024 — and had struck Russian oil facilities over 300 times cumulatively since February 2022 by late June 2026. Reuters estimated strikes reduced Russian refining capacity by approximately 17 percent, or 1.1 million barrels per day.
The scale and acceleration of strikes is the load-bearing fact for the coercion case: whether cumulative damage is outpacing Russia's repair capacity is the central empirical question the analysis turns on.
✓ GROUNDED
Russia's oil and gas revenues fell to a five-year low in 2025 at approximately 8.48–8.7 trillion rubles (roughly $108–110 billion) — approximately 24 percent below 2024 and well below the originally budgeted 10.9 trillion rubles — while GDP growth slowed to an estimated 0.6–1 percent.
Revenue decline at this scale, compounding a defense budget absorbing nearly 40 percent of federal expenditure, creates genuine fiscal compression — but it must be attributed to multiple causes (global oil prices, sanctions, ruble appreciation, strikes), not strikes alone.
✓ GROUNDED
Russian crude oil export volumes rose to a wartime high of approximately 3.46 million barrels per day in early 2026 — above the previous wartime high of 3.36 million bpd in 2023 — even as refined product exports fell, because Moscow redirected unrefined crude to export markets.
This adaptation — selling crude instead of products — is the strongest single datum for the skeptic case: Moscow has a visible workaround that sustains export revenue continuity even while refining capacity contracts.
✓ GROUNDED
Carnegie Endowment analysis found that during the 2024 strike campaign, most struck Russian refineries kept operating at least in part and restored full output within weeks; Russia's 2026 budget was built on an oil export price assumption of approximately $59 per barrel, and Moscow raised VAT from 20 to 22 percent from January 2026 to offset declining hydrocarbon revenues.
Russia's demonstrated repair speed and fiscal substitution capacity (tax hikes, spending reallocation) are the structural ceiling on how quickly strikes can generate irreversible damage — and set the empirical test for whether the 2025–2026 intensification has finally exceeded that ceiling.
✓ GROUNDED

Sources (32)

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