Risk Nodes (11)
FLOW DManufacturerSPOFSevere
Primary crude distillation units (CDUs/ELOU-AVT) at major refineries
A single hit on a CDU or its supporting network can halt an entire refinery's primary throughput, as seen at Omsk where units accounting for ~75% of output went offline after one strike. Output feeding regional depots stops until months-long repairs complete.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: High
CDUs are the bottleneck of any refinery, repairs take months, and a significant share of replacement equipment is imported under sanctions.
Watch Signals:- [Likely] Repeated re-strikes on refineries within weeks of restart (Kstovo pattern) confirming Russia cannot repair faster than Ukraine can strike
- [Possible] Satellite thermal imagery showing extended cold/dark units indicating repairs stalled on missing imported components
FLOW DManufacturerSPOFSevere
Omsk refinery (Gazprom Neft, 22M t/yr)
Loss of Omsk removes the primary refining anchor for Siberia and the eastern regions, spreading shortages to areas that previously felt insulated from the crisis. Mothballed units (CDU-7/8) offer partial, slow recovery.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: Medium
As Russia's single largest refinery and a key Siberian/eastern supply anchor, its output cannot be replaced quickly by other already-strained plants.
Watch Signals:- [Possible] Fuel rationing announcements deepening in Omsk, Novosibirsk and eastern regions following the strike
- [Possible] Reports of CDU-11 restart versus continued outage indicating depth of damage
FLOW DLogisticsSPOFSevere
Electrified rail network and traction substations
Damage to traction substations or fuel trains slows the entire refined-product distribution spine; every downstream depot and truck link is delayed, so deliveries arrive late across the chain.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: Medium
Most refined product moves by rail (little by pipeline) and swapping electric for diesel locomotives on an almost fully electrified network is not straightforward, especially amid a fuel crisis.
Watch Signals:- [Possible] Geolocated strikes on traction substations rather than only rolling stock, signaling escalation to fixed rail infrastructure
- [Likely] Increased rail-bridge strikes in occupied territory (Luhansk-Donetsk line pattern)
FLOW DLogisticsSevere
Front-line fuel tanker trucks (last-mile distribution)
Loss of fuel trucks cuts the depot-to-unit link, starving front-line units of fuel and munitions even where rail-delivered stocks exist at intermediate depots — acute in Crimea and southern occupied territories.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: High
Trucks are being destroyed faster than Russia can replace them; Soviet-era stockpiles and private-sector orders are not keeping pace with loss rates.
Watch Signals:- [Likely] OSINT geolocation of burned tanker convoys on Crimea-Melitopol and Rostov-Luhansk highways
- [Possible] Russian-installed authorities closing more highways to military traffic (Luhansk pattern)
FLOW DLogisticsSPOFSevere
Crimea fuel-supply corridors (Kerch rail, ferry, Azov land route)
With corridors reduced to a fraction of capacity, Crimea functions as a near-isolated fuel island; civilian sales have already been halted and military resupply to the southern front is constrained.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: High
Only three corridors ever existed; all three are degraded and the largest ferry has been destroyed, leaving no full substitute to supply the peninsula.
Watch Signals:- [Likely] Repeat strikes on the Chonhar bridge and Kerch Bridge rail approaches
- [Possible] Extension of Crimea civilian sales halt to full military rationing
FLOW CSupplierSevere
Refinery repair supply chain (imported equipment)
Without imported components, damaged CDUs and hydrocrackers stay offline for many months, converting each successful strike into a semi-permanent capacity loss rather than a temporary outage.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: Medium
A significant share of refining equipment is imported and sanctions complicate restoration, with no rapid domestic substitute for specialized units.
Watch Signals:- [Possible] Reports of Russia sourcing refinery parts through third-country intermediaries or China
- [Possible] Extended outage timelines (e.g. Moscow-area refineries reported offline into late 2026)
FLOW CDistributorModerate
Regional fuel depots and storage reservoirs
Loss of storage removes the buffer that smooths refinery-outage shocks, so a production dip transmits to the pump faster and forces earlier rationing.
Substitutability: MediumFailure Prob: Medium
Depots can be re-tasked and stocks redirected, but destroyed storage reservoirs cannot be quickly rebuilt and reduce buffering capacity system-wide.
Watch Signals:- [Possible] Strikes on Baltic/Black Sea terminal tank farms (Ust-Luga, Vysotsk, Feodosia)
- [Possible] Regional fuel-reserve drawdowns reported ahead of harvest demand
FLOW CSupplierModerate
Belarus fuel-import lifeline
If Belarusian supply is capped or interdicted, Russia loses its main emergency import buffer and must rely on costlier, non-discounted refined-product purchases abroad.
Substitutability: LowFailure Prob: Low
Belarus is the primary friendly refined-product supplier, but its spare export capacity is limited and cannot offset a nationwide shortfall.
Watch Signals:- [Unlikely] Ukrainian strikes on Belarusian refineries or the Mozyr-Russia product line
- [Possible] Belarusian domestic price/supply strain limiting further export increases
FLOW CLogisticsModerate
Shadow-fleet tankers supplying Crimea (Sea of Azov)
Sinking or deterring tankers closes the maritime workaround for Crimea, compounding the loss of the ferry and rail corridors and tightening the peninsula's fuel island effect.
Substitutability: MediumFailure Prob: Medium
Maritime resupply partly substitutes for degraded land routes to Crimea, but vessels are exposed to the same drone/USV campaign and are being sunk.
Watch Signals:- [Likely] USV/drone strikes on tankers near Kerch and Azov ports
- [Possible] Insurers/operators refusing Azov runs, reducing available hulls
FLOW CFinancialModerate
Crude export revenue stream (India discount sales)
As refining collapses, Russia shifts to exporting cheaper crude and importing expensive product, squeezing the fiscal surplus available for weapons production and subsidies.
Substitutability: MediumFailure Prob: Low
Crude can still be exported via pipeline/tanker with buyers like India, but discounts plus the cost of buying back refined product compress the margin that funds the war.
Watch Signals:- [Possible] Widening Urals/refined-product price spread reported by energy trackers
- [Possible] Cuts or strain in the fuel-price subsidy program
FLOW BManufacturerModerate
Angarsk refinery (Irkutsk) — geographic sanctuary
Angarsk continues producing but its eastern location means it cannot meaningfully offset western/southern shortfalls; its loss would be felt regionally, not nationally.
Substitutability: MediumFailure Prob: Low
As one of the only large refineries beyond reliable drone range, it retains output, but it is too distant to resupply European Russia or the front efficiently.
Watch Signals:- [Unlikely] First recorded Ukrainian strike attempt at Angarsk, indicating extended drone reach past 4,000 km
- [Possible] Rail diversion of Angarsk product westward straining eastern supply
Propagation Chains (3)
SevereWeeksHigh prob
Triggered by Primary crude distillation units at major refineries
Primary crude distillation units (CDUs/ELOU-AVT) at major refineries → Regional fuel depots and storage reservoirs → Electrified rail network and traction substations → Front-line fuel tanker trucks (last-mile distribution)
A CDU strike halts a refinery's throughput, drawing down regional depot stocks that no longer refill at normal rates. Because product moves mainly by an electrified rail spine already under attack, redistribution to cover the gap is slow, and the shortfall reaches the last-mile tanker-truck layer that is itself being attrited. The result is rationing in regions far from any strike, as fuel is redirected toward Moscow, industry, and military priorities.
SevereDaysHigh prob
Triggered by Crimea fuel-supply corridors
Crimea fuel-supply corridors (Kerch rail, ferry, Azov land route) → Shadow-fleet tankers supplying Crimea (Sea of Azov) → Front-line fuel tanker trucks (last-mile distribution)
Degradation of the Kerch rail, ferry, and Azov land corridors pushes resupply onto shadow-fleet tankers, which are then struck at sea. With maritime and land routes both constrained, the surviving tanker trucks inside Crimea cannot be replenished, isolating the peninsula and starving southern-front units of fuel and munitions. Crimea has already halted civilian gasoline sales, signaling the buffer is largely exhausted.
SevereWeeksMedium prob
Triggered by Electrified rail network and traction substations
Electrified rail network and traction substations → Regional fuel depots and storage reservoirs → Front-line fuel tanker trucks (last-mile distribution)
Damage to traction substations or repeated fuel-train strikes slow the refined-product spine that European Russia depends on. Depots receive product late, the buffer thins, and every downstream truck delivery is pushed back. Because diesel-locomotive substitution on an electrified network is not straightforward, the delay compounds across the whole chain rather than being routed around.
Critical Vulnerabilities (4)
Single interconnected fuel system transmits local shocks nationwide
Russia's fuel network operates as one interconnected system, so a strike in European Russia produces shortages in Siberia and the Far East where no refinery was hit. Product is redirected to Moscow, industry, and military priorities, leaving remote regions supplied on a residual basis.
Affects: Primary crude distillation units (CDUs/ELOU-AVT) at major refineries, Electrified rail network and traction substations, Regional fuel depots and storage reservoirs
Loss of geographic sanctuary for refining
Ukraine's ~2,500-3,000 km strike on Omsk removed the assumption that distance protects eastern refineries, leaving only Angarsk largely beyond reach. Nearly every major refinery is now within the demonstrated threat envelope.
Affects: Primary crude distillation units (CDUs/ELOU-AVT) at major refineries, Omsk refinery (Gazprom Neft, 22M t/yr), Angarsk refinery (Irkutsk) — geographic sanctuary
Repair-tempo deficit against strike tempo
Months-long repairs dependent on sanctioned imported equipment cannot keep pace with a strike rate that hit 194 refinery attacks in H1 2026, including re-strikes on freshly restarted plants. Each hit trends toward semi-permanent rather than temporary capacity loss.
Affects: Primary crude distillation units (CDUs/ELOU-AVT) at major refineries, Refinery repair supply chain (imported equipment)
Last-mile distribution attrition outrunning replacement
Fuel trucks and rail tankers are being destroyed faster than Russia can replace them from Soviet-era stocks or private-sector orders. This makes the depot-to-unit link, not just production, an independent point of failure — acute in Crimea and the southern occupied territories.
Affects: Front-line fuel tanker trucks (last-mile distribution), Crimea fuel-supply corridors (Kerch rail, ferry, Azov land route), Shadow-fleet tankers supplying Crimea (Sea of Azov)
Mitigation Priorities (4)
FLOW DImmediate
Harden and layer air defense over top refineries and traction substations
Rationale: With 42.74% of refining capacity claimed disabled and nearly every major refinery now within drone reach after the Omsk strike, protecting the surviving CDUs and the electrified rail spine is the highest-leverage move. Russia is reportedly already surging S-400 systems toward Moscow, indicating this is the active line of effort.
Action: Combatant-command air-defense cell prioritizes point defense (EW, short-range AD, netting) for the top-throughput refineries and identified traction substations, sequencing coverage by throughput share rather than proximity to Ukraine.
FLOW DNear-Term
Pre-stock and disperse forward fuel depots beyond truck-attrition zones
Rationale: With ~425 vehicles/fuel tanks destroyed per day and 360 fuel trucks lost in a single week, the last-mile link is failing independently of production; buffering fuel closer to units reduces exposed truck-miles. This mirrors pre-positioning logic that reduces long, interdictable supply runs.
Action: Theater logistics staff builds a dispersed, hardened depot plan that shortens truck runs into Crimea and the southern occupied territories, signed off by the theater commander as standing guidance.
FLOW CNear-Term
Expand import substitution and re-task crude to product where possible
Rationale: Belarus has already raised exports to a record high and Russia is buying refined product abroad while selling crude to India at a discount — a costly, thin buffer that must be widened while domestic refining is down ~25% and ~20% below demand.
Action: Energy-ministry logistics cell maximizes Belarusian and third-country refined-product import contracts and rail slots, accepting non-discounted pricing as the cost of covering the domestic gap.
FLOW CLong-Term
Accelerate refinery repair via domestic/third-country component sourcing
Rationale: Repairs run months and depend on sanctioned imported equipment, so each of the 194 H1 strikes trends toward semi-permanent loss unless the component pipeline is widened. Shortening restart time is the only way to close the gap between strike tempo and recovery tempo.
Action: Refining-sector authority stands up an expedited parts-sourcing channel through third-country intermediaries and domestic fabrication for CDU-critical components, prioritized by facility throughput.
Facts & Figures (8)
The claims behind this analysis, each with its verification status — including what is contested, unverified, or could not be established.
On 4 July 2026 Ukraine's General Staff estimated 42.74% of Russia's oil refining capacity disabled, while the IEA said 'more than 20%' was offline and Finland's president cited a 40% reduction in produce/export capacity.
The wide spread between official Ukrainian claims (~43%) and IEA (~20%+) is itself the intelligence-picture ambiguity that drives complexity — the true degradation is contested.
✓ GROUNDED
Ukraine struck Russian refineries at least 194 times in H1 2026 (11x the same period in 2025), with a record 16 successful strikes in May per Rochan Consulting/FT.
The strike tempo is structural and accelerating, not a one-off; mitigation must assume repeated re-strikes on repaired facilities.
✓ GROUNDED
June 2026 crude processed fell ~25% year-on-year to 3.95 million bpd (lowest in over two decades); gasoline output fell ~17% to 850,000 bpd, running ~20% below domestic demand.
Quantifies the gap between supply and demand that forces rationing and prioritization of military over civilian fuel.
✓ GROUNDED
The Omsk refinery (22M tons/yr, Russia's largest) was struck July 6 at ~2,500-3,000 km — the last of Russia's top 11 refineries previously untouched; only Angarsk (Irkutsk, ~4,450 km) remains largely undamaged, protected by distance.
Removes the assumption that geographic depth is sanctuary; only one major refinery now sits beyond reliable drone reach.
✓ GROUNDED
Between May 24 and July 9, 2026 Ukraine's MoD reported destruction of 18,265 Russian vehicles and fuel tanks (~425/day); Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces reported 360 fuel trucks destroyed in one week.
Front-line distribution is being attrited faster than replacement, meaning the crisis is at the last-mile as much as at production.
✓ GROUNDED
European Russia's rail is almost entirely electrified; refined product moves mostly by rail (little by pipeline), and Ukraine has targeted traction substations and ~20 trains (many fuel trains) since January 2026.
Rail is the irreplaceable spine for refined-product distribution; electrified-line and substation vulnerability means diesel-locomotive substitution is not straightforward.
✓ GROUNDED
Crimea's three historical fuel-supply routes (Kerch Bridge rail, Taman-Crimea ferry, and the Azov-coast R-280/rail corridor via Mariupol-Melitopol-Dzhankoi) have been degraded; the ferry Slavyanin (which could carry ~50 tanker cars / ~3,000 tonnes) was destroyed, and Crimea halted civilian gasoline sales.
Crimea is a near-isolated fuel island with a handful of chokepoints — a concentrated, high-consequence sub-network.
✓ GROUNDED
Belarus increased fuel exports to Russia to a record high in June 2026, and Russia is buying refined products abroad while selling crude to India at a discount.
Import substitution exists but is limited, costly (no discount on refined product), and concentrated on one friendly supplier — a thin buffer, not a fix.
✓ GROUNDED