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What the Record Establishes

Across the wargame literature, congressional simulation record, and DoD budget exhibits, LRASM, JASSM-ER, and Tomahawk are consistently identified as the munitions most likely to be exhausted early in a Taiwan Strait contingency, while the primary procurement record shows multiyear contracting action underway but no single document in this record verifying that current or planned buy rates close the gap against wargamed consumption.

This record assembles the primary documentary basis — CSIS wargame findings, House Select Committee on the CCP simulation results, and DoD budget justification exhibits — for assessing U.S. long-range anti-ship and land-attack missile stockpiles (LRASM, JASSM/JASSM-ER, Tomahawk) against the demands of a Taiwan Strait contingency.

The documentary record on long-range precision-strike munitions for a Taiwan contingency rests on three distinct instrument types, each with different evidentiary weight. CSIS's 2023 wargame report, The First Battle of the Next War, models a Chinese invasion of Taiwan across 24 iterations and — per a secondary academic analysis citing the report directly — projects that the number of Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) available to the U.S. "is likely to be fewer than 500 in 2026" and can only be launched from a limited number of aerial platforms. CSIS's own project description confirms the wargame used analytically based rules combining historical operations-research analogies (Normandy, Okinawa, the Falklands) with theoretical weapons-performance data rather than personal judgment.

The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party ran a separate, later exercise — a CSIS-facilitated tabletop simulation for committee members on the state of the defense industrial base, held per the Committee's own internal-events posting. The Committee's official media package states plainly that the U.S. and Taiwan ran low on critical munitions in a matter of days, and names LRASMs, Taiwan's Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, and JASSM-ER as the munitions most impacted. The same document places replacement timelines for Tomahawk Block V, LRASM, and JASSM at roughly two years, and separately states that the U.S. defense industrial base would, at then-current production capacity, be unable to replace simulated combat losses.

The budget-side record is comparatively precise. The Navy's LRASM multiyear-procurement justification exhibit states verbatim that the proposal covers 477 AGM-158 LRASMs across FY2024–FY2028 under a single five-year fixed-price contract, following seven years of prior production (FY2017–2023), and explicitly cites a finding by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)) that identified critical shortfalls in missile inventory essential to National Defense Strategy priorities. Congressional Research Service analysis of the FY2026 budget submission — drawing on the DoD Procurement Programs (P-1) and military department justification books — states that DoD requested $35.7 billion in procurement and RDT&E funding for missile and munitions programs government-wide, with $30.2 billion of that directed to a defined set of selected missile and munitions programs.

Where the record is thinner: no primary DoD budget justification document surfaced in this record states a specific FY2026 or FY2027 procurement quantity for Tomahawk or JASSM in verbatim, pinpoint-cited form — the CRS report references these programs in aggregate tables not reproduced here verbatim, and Tomahawk-specific historical procurement data (e.g., annual buy quantities) comes from Selected Acquisition Reports for years prior to the current budget cycle. The full CSIS wargame report text (PDF) was reachable but did not yield a directly quotable LRASM/JASSM expenditure figure in the search results at the necessary confidence level; the fewer-than-500-LRASM figure is sourced to a secondary policy-analysis paper's citation of specific page numbers in the CSIS report, not to CSIS's own words extracted directly.

Every excerpt verbatim from the named document, with a pinpoint citation. Nothing here is paraphrased or invented.

Source facts the analysis is grounded in. The → chips after each fact link to the items above that rely on it.

The claims behind this analysis, each with its verification status — including what is contested, unverified, or could not be established.

September 3, 2026

September 3, 2026

September 3, 2026